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In recent years we have witnessed the rise of the platform
economy. The world’s most valuable public companies are
five American technology firms: Microsoft, Amazon,
Apple, Alphabet (Google), and Facebook. These compa-
nies are closely followed by Chinese tech giants such as
Alibaba, Tencent, Baidu, and Xiaomi, and many more US-
based internet companies such as Netflix, eBay, Uber,
Salesforce, and Airbnb. Most of these organizations are
young (Apple and Microsoft being the adolescents) and
were able to grow extremely fast due to the digital plat-
forms they provide. The most common types of platforms
are transaction platforms that match supply and demand
(e.g., Amazon, Alibaba, Airbnb, Uber, and Baidu). Other
examples are technology platforms that provide a technical
infrastructure that other people can build upon (e.g.,
Microsoft’s software platform and the App stores of Goo-
gle and Apple). These digital platforms have radically
changed the way we work, do business, socialize, learn,
move, produce, etc. Such platforms can be found in any
domain, ranging from learning (e.g., Coursera, EdX,
Udacity, and FutureLearn) to smart homes (e.g., Amazon
Alexa, Apple Homekit, Google Assistant, Philips Hue, and
Samsung SmartThings). The rise of these digital platforms
is highly relevant for BISE (Business & Information Sys-
tems Engineering) authors and readers, because they
combine new business models with technological innova-
tions (e.g., machine learning).
The Winner Takes it All For sure, large-scale digital
platforms make our lives easier (Kenney and Zysman
2016; de Reuver et al. 2018; Stummer et al. 2018). Prod-
ucts and services are delivered faster and more cheaply.
These platforms have also made it easier to connect people
and businesses. Uber connects drivers and passengers that
would otherwise never get together. We find information
that we would have never found thanks to Google. We may
establish valuable connections through LinkedIn. Using
Amazon we are able to buy almost anything at a lower
price and in a more convenient manner. Amazon Market-
place enables third-party sellers to sell products alongside
Amazon’s regular offerings. Imagine that there were 50
competing Ubers, Googles, LinkedIns, and Amazons, all
covering different segments of the internet, professions, or
product types. This would lead to inefficiencies and frus-
tration. Therefore, as consumers, we tend to benefit from
these big digital platforms.
Successful platforms have the characteristic that they
grow very fast and that, in the end, often one winner
remains. After a platform has become the market leader, it
is very difficult to compete for organizations that started
later. IBM still dominates the computer mainframe market
after 60 years. Intel and Microsoft are still dominant in the
processor market and the software market for personal
computers. It seems that Google, Amazon, and Facebook
will dominate, respectively, search, shopping, and social
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media for years to come. A rule of thumb is that successful
platforms can be ‘‘eclipsed’’ but not ‘‘displaced’’ (Barwise
2018; Barwise and Watkins 2018). For example, Kodak
had a market share of 85% in camera sales and 90% in film
sales. It was not the direct competition, but the shift to
digitization that caused the decline of Kodak. The tradi-
tional camera business was eclipsed by digital cameras
which in turn were eclipsed by smartphones.
Why do successful platforms evolve into monopolistic
platforms where the winner takes it all? There are several
reasons for this (Shapiro and Varian 1999; Stummer et al.
2018). First of all, the traditional economy of scale applies.
Digital products and services tend to require huge fixed
costs and low marginal costs. For example, it is very costly
to develop machine-learning techniques that scale well.
However, applying the learned model to a new batch of
customers is cheap. Note that the marginal transaction costs
for Airbnb and Uber are close to zero. If there are losses,
these are caused by fixed costs. Second, there are often so-
called ‘‘network effects’’. The more people or organiza-
tions join, the more valuable the platform becomes. If only
one of your friends is on Facebook, then the platform is less
valuable than when almost all of your friends are on
Facebook. Offering just one room in Amsterdam makes
Airbnb less valuable, however, when thousands of rooms
are offered by Airbnb the value increases. Also, machine
learning techniques work better when there are more data.
Hence, as the platform usage increases, automatically the
quality of the platform increases. Next to these network
effects, technology companies use a range of strategies to
lock-in users (e.g., not trying to reducing switching costs).
Data Protection is Just One Element The success of the
big digital platforms has triggered quite some concerns.
The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is the
most important change in regulating data privacy in the last
20 years and was set off by concerns about the rise of the
big digital platforms. Mark Zuckerberg, the chief executive
of Facebook, was scrutinized by members of the European
Parliament because of privacy breaches in May 2018. For a
long time, the leading American technology firms were not
hindered by regulators and politicians. However, this has
changed recently. Not long ago, US president Trump
accused Facebook, Google, and even his preferred com-
munications outlet, Twitter, of a bias against conservative
opinions. This fueled antitrust investigations against
Facebook, Google, Apple, and Amazon. Hence, big digital
platforms have been put under scrutiny for very different
reasons (Bercovici 2019; Day and Gu 2019). Some of these
arguments against big digital platforms are rather artificial.
However, there are clear negative side-effects.
Figure 1 highlights four potential problems caused by
successful digital platforms. First of all, there is the
problem that competition becomes difficult as soon as there
is a clear market leader (‘‘the winner takes it all’’) and
dominance may stifle innovation. Second, the platform
may collect lots of confidential data. For example, the
Facebook – Cambridge Analytica data scandal in 2018
revealed that the personal data of millions of people’s
Facebook profiles were used for political advertising pur-
poses. There are also more subtle uses of user data by the
platform, e.g., recommending things your friends buy.
Often it is unclear where the ethical and legal boundaries
are. The third problem shown in Fig. 1 is a possible bias in
the rankings created by the platform. This may range from
filtering out certain opinions (e.g., for political purposes) to
ranking products in an unfair manner. In such cases algo-
rithms are manipulated to provide a different outcome,
giving advantage to a third party (possibly the platform
itself). For example, Google was accused of promoting its
own comparison shopping service in search results. Ama-
zon is both a digital platform and a supplier of products
(smartphones, televisions, speakers, TV-series, diapers,
etc.), which automatically leads to conflicting interests.
The fourth problem is that large digital platforms tend to
integrate the market horizontally, sometimes even verti-
cally, utilizing their user base as an asset. Moreover, the
profits generated by a dominant platform may be exploited
to subsidize expansion in other sectors. For example,
Google uses its profits from search engine marketing to
invest in many other services and products. As a result,
competition in upcoming markets becomes difficult.
The focus in Europe seems to be on the second problem
in Fig. 1 (i.e., privacy and confidentiality). The GDPR is a
prime example of this. However, one could argue that
complex regulations such as the GDPR only strengthen the
positions of large tech companies (that have strong legal
support and ways of handling advanced technological
challenges). Moreover, is privacy the biggest problem we
are facing? The search-engine market-share of Google is
estimated to be 92.6% (July 2019). The second largest
search engine (Bing) has only 2.5%. Amazon is selling
84% of all e-books purchased (Day and Gu 2019). How-
ever, companies are allowed to posses such complete
market dominance according to the current interpretations
of antitrust laws in most countries. The dominance of a
platform in one sector may also jeopardize competition in
other sectors (fourth problem in Fig. 1). Hence, a mono-
poly in one sector can easily lead to additional monopolies
in other sectors.
Transportation as a Platform The significance of dig-
ital platforms is underestimated because they appear to be
virtual (‘‘in the cloud’’). However, these platforms do not
only influence the digital world. For example, retail shops
in city centers are struggling to survive. The platform
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economy will increasingly impact the physical world. For
example, we anticipate that platforms will more and more
affect transportation and the use of public spaces. Auton-
omous self-driving cars may exist only in a transitional
phase. To make best use of the scarce space, autonomy
may be counterproductive (autonomous self-driving cars
driving at different speeds all looking for parking spots in a
city will not solve the challenges cities are facing). Roads
could become part of a digital platform with standard
interfaces and services. Platform companies could bid to be
able to manage all the roads in a particular city or region.
This is comparable to today’s 5G spectrum auctions where
companies can bid for frequencies. For example, in June
2019, the 5G auction in Germany raised €6.6 billion from
four telecom operators. Frequencies can be compared to
roads and other public spaces, and may be auctioned in the
future. Viewing the roads as a digital platform would allow
for a much better use of public space (matching supply and
demand and optimizing the throughput) and a range of new
services. However, such developments will also trigger a
range of questions, both of a technological and a regulatory
nature.
Relevance for BISE The remarkable expansion of big
digital platforms is changing the way we analyze, design,
implement, and manage information systems. Hence, this is
highly relevant for the BISE audience, but only a few
publications exist on the topic (Hinz et al. 2019). More-
over, digital platforms based on network effects are diffi-
cult to replicate, e.g., in a laboratory. This makes it difficult
to explore features or mechanisms that are not already
implemented by the platforms. It is even difficult to con-
duct surveys based solely on hypothetical questions and
intentions without framing the participants. An opportunity
may be provided by open data. For example, in de Reuver
et al. (2018) the authors state that ‘‘data-driven’’ approa-
ches can assist research on digital platforms due to the
increasing availability of openly accessible data. Forcing
organizations to provide anonymized open data may help
to address the negative side effects mentioned.
It is also interesting to see the role platforms play in our
research. We store our code on GitHub or SourceForge and
publish our papers via the platforms of Springer and
Elsevier. For machine learning, we build upon ecosystems
such as Python (with libraries such as Scikit-Learn), R,
RapidMiner, Knime, and TensorFlow. However, these are
very different from the transaction-oriented digital plat-
forms mentioned before (Amazon, Alibaba, Airbnb, Uber,
and Baidu). Also, Google, Amazon, Apple, and Facebook
are heavily investing in machine learning (in particular
deep learning). They do this because of the importance of
machine learning for the effectiveness of their platforms.
However, by pinching talent from universities, they may
also threaten the training of the next generation of aca-
demics (Procaccia 2019). This shows that the impact of big
digital platforms is multifaceted and cannot be left to
politicians. Hence, we encourage BISE researchers to
actively engage in debates on the governance of these
platforms.
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